Season 3, Episode 9: Let It Burn
A bomb containing engineered smallpox virus is found in Grand Central Station. Analysis shows that the virus has a faulty genome - there is a mistake in the genetic code. It would appear that whoever built the virus did so just to show that it could be done using information freely available on the internet. Later, the virus' mysterious creator sends David a text message directing him to a website, which advocates for the removal of all dangerous scientific information from the internet. But precisely what constitutes "dangerous scientific information"?
Dual-use research
Back in Episode 3, David suggested that "there are genetics programs out there under way right now that make the Manhattan Project look like a bunch of babies playing with Lego blocks." Comparing genetics to the development of the atomic bomb?! Surely, David exaggerates about the risks of current genetics programs…or does he?
The atomic energy research that enabled the development of the atomic bomb under the Manhattan Project is a classic example of what is sometimes referred to as "dual-use" research - legitimate research that can be used for both beneficial and harmful applications.
Researchers have begun to contend with the possibility that countless areas of biomedical research could be similarly considered “dual-use”. Genetic manipulation, genomics, nanotechnology, viral engineering – these are very powerful technologies: powerful enough to enable scientists to make revolutionary strides in increasing our understanding of ourselves and the world around us; but also powerful enough that, if misused, they could be extremely dangerous. For example, these technologies and the knowledge they are used to create could be used to lower the barrier to engineer biological weapons that, in turn, could be used by terrorists. It seems that this is precisely the point that the rogue viral engineer is trying to convey in this episode.
We should remember, however, that many of the problems that NorBAC deals with are not caused by misadventure or misuse of powerful new biotechnologies. NorBAC scientists use those same technologies, scientific techniques and information as tools to help protect and preserve the health of individuals and the public at large.
The same is true of scientists in "real world" labs, where they look to harness the awesome power of new technologies to help and not to harm. However, there still exists the possibility - however unlikely - that a person or group would want to use the fruits of biomedical science to do harm.
So what can - or should - be done to address this dual-use potential?
In the US, a 2003 report from the US National Research Council (NRC), entitled "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma," led to the creation of the National Scientific Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), whose responsibilities include advising on strategies for oversight of federally-funded life sciences research with dual-use potential.
The Government of Canada, through Health Canada and Defense R&D Canada, has also started to develop an appropriate policy framework to address dual-use research, through consultations with scientists, publishers, security personnel, law makers, ethicists, and other stakeholders.
But exactly what research are we talking about? How can we determine what constitutes dual-use research in the first place? The 2003 NRC report suggests a starting point: It lists seven classes of what the NRC considers "experiments of concern" due to their potential implications for the creation and use of biological weapons. These experiments include those that would alter the infectious capabilities - virulence, host range, resistance properties - of pathogenic bacteria and viruses.
Of course, the NRC's list of experiments of concern is not exhaustive; there are numerous other types of experiments and areas of research that could be equally dangerous if misapplied. One such area, highlighted in this episode, is genomics; in particular, the publication of genome sequences for known pathogens - like smallpox - in the open scientific literature and on the internet, where anyone can access them.
Genome sequences for all to see
The last installment of Facts Behind the Fiction mentioned an experiment in which researchers were able to use freely available genome sequence information to construct polio virus using standard lab techniques and equipment. Similarly, the open publication of the genome sequences of many other pathogens – for example, those responsible for anthrax, Ebola, and plague – could unintentionally make it easier to engineer and use these pathogens for terrorist purposes.
However, allowing scientists unfettered access to these sequences is crucial to enabling research to provide deeper understanding of infectious diseases and how to treat or prevent them. As David says in this episode, when considering the rogue scientist's request to remove potentially dangerous scientific information from the internet, scientists need a free flow of information - censorship isn't the answer.
And David is not alone in his thinking. In late 2003, the NRC put together an international committee to look at the issues around open access to pathogens' genome sequences. The 2004 report from this committee made a number of recommendations, including:
- Policies with regard to release of genome data on microbial pathogens should not change [from the current standard of open access]. Rapid, unrestricted public access to primary genome sequence data, annotations of genome data, genome databases, and Internet-based tools for genome analysis should be encouraged.
- Genomics and genome sequence data should be exploited fully to improve our ability to defend against infectious agents of all types, including those … that could be used in a bioterrorist attack.
Indeed, genomics is powerful stuff, with profound potential to help us understand infectious diseases and enable further discoveries that may alleviate the suffering that such diseases cause. That does not change the fact that there likely are - and likely will always be - people out there who would seek to misuse discoveries in genomics and other biomedical research areas to do harm. It is this unfortunate likelihood that makes prudent ongoing efforts to acknowledge and address the dual-use potential of biomedical research. Central to these efforts is the desire to protect and promote the public good, while ensuring that science is able to march ahead toward discovery without being unnecessarily impeded.
More food for thought
Q: In this episode, Robbie McKain cautions that "this is science out of control, Dr. Sandström." David counters by opining: "I don't think science is benevolent; it's benign." Do you think science is benign? Why or why not? Does it depend on the type of research?
Q: What other kinds of research might be considered "dual-use"?
Q: Suppose you are charged with developing an appropriate oversight framework for dual-use research. What would you need to consider? What kinds of limitations or restrictions, if any, should the framework impose?
Want to read and learn more?
To learn more about how Canada is addressing the dual-use dilemma, see:
http://www.csm-scm.org/database/presentations/1877.pdf
To read the 2003 NRC report, "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma", download it from:
http://books.nap.edu/html/biotechnology_research/0309089778.pdf
To read the 2004 NRC report, "Seeking Security: Pathogens, Open Access and Genome Databases" online, visit:
http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11087
