Season 4, Episode 9: Unbottled

NorBAC is invaded by members of a terrorist cell who intend to unleash a genetically engineered plague on the world. David, Carlos, Rachel, Bob and Mayko are trapped and forced to do the critical work of constructing the genome for a new and more virulent version of measles-a seemingly innocuous disease that nonetheless has the potential to kill millions worldwide.

The terrorists know exactly what RNA sequences they're looking for. The reason? The research that inspired them is available on the internet (behind a firewall, but we all know those can be hacked). All they need is access to the data, and access to a lab such as NorBAC's, and they can create a weaponized super-plague in a matter of days.

Is this a credible scenario? Unfortunately, many experts believe that it is. The US government is sufficiently concerned, in fact, that in 2003 it formed the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which advises government and academia on how to minimize the risk from so-called dual-use research. The NAS board defines dual-use research as "life sciences research undertaken for legitimate scientific and public health reasons that has the potential to be misused to threaten public health and other aspects of national security."

BIRD FLU AND THE 1918 PANDEMIC

One recent example of dual-use research is the discovery and sequencing of the Spanish flu (influenza) virus. Between 1918 and 1920, a type-A flu strain originating in the United States killed an estimated 20 to 100 million people, possibly twice as many as died in World War I. After the outbreak subsided, the strain causing it never returned, making it impossible throughout the twentieth century to determine exactly what Spanish flu was or what made it so virulent. Recently, however, researchers were able to reconstruct the virus, and its genetic sequence was made publically available to make it easier for other researchers to probe the information contained in the sequence.

It was thought for a long time that the Spanish flu had jumped from birds to swine and from swine to humans. We now know it spread directly from birds to humans. A particularly striking characteristic of this flu was that it killed strong, healthy young people as often as the elderly or sick. Spanish flu could kill within one day of a person developing symptoms. It shares many characteristics with the current H5N1 avian influenza ("bird flu") virus, which many health experts believe will eventually break out into a new pandemic.

Why do something so dangerous as to resurrect one of the deadliest plagues in history? The problem is that H5N1 is out there right now. Through research on the Spanish flu, scientists can uncover what made the Spanish flu so deadly; their discoveries could help prevent tens of millions of deaths should H5N1 break out and start widely infecting people. Already, scientists have learned that Spanish flu had a strikingly fast reproduction rate in the body, and also that it could kick the body's immune system into overdrive, resulting in an autoimmune 'cytokine storm'. Victims died from the effects of their own immune response rather than from direct damage caused by the virus. This appears to be exactly the same mechanism that makes H5N1 so deadly. Thus, devising an effective treatment for Spanish flu may result in a treatment for H5N1.

GENIES AND BOTTLES

Although the researchers at NorBAC are shown making many critical discoveries in ReGenesis, in reality research is highly collaborative, relying on work done in many locations simultaneously. The dual-use research that resulted in the sequencing of the Spanish flu was such a widespread effort. Any new treatments that result from the science will similarly be the result of global efforts.

Such efforts can only proceed when crucial information is readily available to everyone. Without knowing the Spanish flu's genetic makeup, scientists can't devise a defense against it. The free sharing of information is critical to performing such life-saving science.

It is unfortunately quite possible for terrorists or hostile governments to wait on the sidelines for legitimate scientists to do all the heavy lifting; then they can cherry-pick the results for weapons. Will such open research policies therefore do more harm than good?

The alternatives to open research policies would seem to be either closed, tightly monitored research, or no research at all. The no-research option would, of course, only apply to the good guys: there is no way we could prevent scientists in other countries or in terrorist cells from trying to reconstruct the Spanish flu. Do you want the bad guys to know more about how H5N1 kills than we do?

The alternative is closed research. One striking detail in this episode, however, is that although the terrorists initially find it difficult to gain access to a classified government website, once there they can simply download the genetic data they're after. No closed system is perfect, and once data escapes into the outside world it is 'lost'-as the recording industry has discovered with regard to mp3 downloads.

The more barriers there are to accessing genetic data, the fewer institutions will be able to do research using them. That means fewer good guys, while it only takes one bad guy to steal the data and give it to the rest.

The safest choice appears to be to get as many good guys involved as possible, and to do that you have to risk the bad guys getting access to the data as well. Only by pooling our efforts can we hope to keep ahead of them. This does not mean promiscuous spreading of dangerous information to everyone; organizations like the US NSABB exist specifically to ensure that the safest middle line is steered between secrecy and openness. In his 2005 opening remarks to the board, Dr. Elias Zerhouni, M.D., Director of the US National Institutes of Health, suggested the following reasons why openness in dual-use research should be permitted:

• There is no absolute threshold at which one can determine an appropriate risk-benefit ratio for dual-use research.
• Therefore, a culture of responsibility among researchers and government agencies is the only effective course of action. Promoting this culture locally should be a main goal of policy.
• Inclusion and participation are key to ensuring that these new cultural norms are implemented. A culture can't propagate between isolated, closed shops.
• Some aspects of dual-use research will need to be restricted. Dr. Zerhouni pledged that the NIH would regularly consult with the NSABB, and held this up as a practice for other agencies to follow.

Dual-use research is almost literally a two-edged sword. There is no easy formula to guarantee its safety, but there are protocols that can minimize the risks. It seems, however, that the alternatives to open research are even less secure.

--Karl Schroeder

About the Author

Karl Schroeder is an award-winning science fiction writer and the author of eight books. He also consults on technology foresight for clients such as the Canadian government and military. His articles and commentary can sometimes be found on the popular weblog WorldChanging.com, and he maintains his own website and blog at www.karlschroeder.com.

Want to read and learn more?

To learn more about how Canada is addressing the dual-use dilemma, see:
http://www.csm-scm.org/database/presentations/1877.pdf

To read the 2003 NRC report, "Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: Confronting the Dual-Use Dilemma", download it from:
http://books.nap.edu/html/biotechnology_research/0309089778.pdf

To learn more about H5N1 avian influenza, try these sites:
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/influenza/avian_e.html